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Abstract
The current European Union reapproval procedure for glyphosate is developed as a case study testing 
whether the 12 precautionary lessons identified by European Environment Agency research as needed 
to avoid unnecessary harm to society have been incorporated into current regulatory approaches. The 
working hypothesis that those lessons have not been learnt to a significant degree could not be falsified.
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Introduction
Glyphosate is the active ingredient in the world’s best-selling herbicides and is currently available in more 
than 300 different formulations in Europe alone (Glyphosate Task Force). The European Commission 
(EC) had been expected to reauthorize glyphosate friction-free until the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer of the World Health Organization (IARC) classified this herbicide as probably 
carcinogenic to humans (IARC, 2015).
However, when the European Food Safety Authority, as mandated by law, later published its own 
conclusions, it stated the herbicide was ‘unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to humans’ (EFSA, 2015). 
The EC has already published a proposal to reapprove glyphosate based on EFSA’s advice, to be voted 
on by Member States (Giannopolitis, 2016).
This kind of controversy can be expected but how careful should the political decision be in the face of 
scientific incoherence? In 2001 the European Environment Agency demonstrated a low precaution level 
was not in society’s interest and derived twelve lessons that should be learnt so history doesn’t repeat 
itself and harm is avoided (EEA, 2001).
The current glyphosate reauthorization procedure will be checked below against each of these lessons 
(paraphrased in the title of each section below) to determine whether they have been incorporated at 
all into European thinking, with the underlying hypothesis that no such thing happened – not to a 
significant degree. If, on the other hand, the learning effectively took place, then it should not be possible 
to find glaring examples to the contrary.
Lesson 1: deal with unknowns
It is not within the reach of scientists to immediately and fully answer questions as they arise, let alone 
identify beforehand all questions that need asking. Are there ways of safeguarding against current 
unknowns that could translate into future risks?
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Glyphosate has been shown to exhibit synergistic behaviour when in the presence of coadjuvants (other 
chemicals, considered inert by the regulatory authorities) included in the herbicide formulation). 
Richard et al. (2005) showed over ten years ago that Roundup (a commercial glyphosate-based herbicide) 
was consistently more toxic than glyphosate alone. An Argentinian group (Chaufan et al., 2014), 
working with agriculturally realistic concentrations, found toxic effects in a glyphosate formulation 
where none could be found with glyphosate alone.
In its draft renewal text (DG SANTE, 2016) the EC recognises the issue when it mandates that one 
particular group of coadjuvants (POE-tallowamine, or POE-15) not be used in glyphosate-based 
herbicides (GBH). However, problems have been shown to occur with other chemicals also present 
in GBH (Mesnage et al., 2013), and various combinations have not been tested at all (Mesnage et al., 
2014), which indicates major data gaps. This illustrates glyphosate’s clear potential for future surprises 
while at the same time hinting at regulatory unwillingness to consider it.
Lesson 2: look for early warnings
Early warnings may take the shape of solitary publications in lesser journals, but they must not be 
disregarded, particularly if there is no monitoring in place for early detection of unexpected impacts. 
Such is the case for glyphosate as an endocrine disruptor since the EC has yet to define the necessary 
official testing criteria (Horel, 2015).
The inability to pinpoint the origin of the endocrine disrupting effects (whether glyphosate itself or 
coadjuvants) in papers by the Séralini group was enough for the Renewal Assessment Report (RAR) 
to disqualify the data (Anonymous, 2013). Where research used pure glyphosate, however, such as in 
Thongprakaisang’s work, the disruption detected was reviewed apologetically. In the final listing of 
peer-reviewed scientific studies on in vitro endocrine disrupting effects, 11 out of the 12 publications 
mentioned are classified as ‘not reliable’ and ‘not relevant’ for one reason or another. The remaining paper 
was considered ‘reliable/relevant with restrictions’ with the added consideration that ‘no conclusion can 
be drawn that the observed effects are the result of glyphosate exposure.’ All 12 articles had detected 
some sort of negative impact in glyphosate or GBH exposure.
Such a blanket repudiation of peer-reviewed research points to a deliberate prejudgment of any evidence 
harming an authorisation. The introduction to the RAR states the work overload prevented reviewers 
from analysing the primary literature, relying instead on the industry’s own assessment. This conveys 
a tainted overtone and is not compatible with a serious determination to find warnings where they 
might exist.
Lesson 3: react to detected weaknesses
One aspect of the glyphosate controversy is its teratogenicity. A 2012 review (Antoniou et al., 2012) 
points to such effects after glyphosate or GBH exposure. It also describes how a previous (1998) German 
assessment report equivocally stated that the regulatory (industry commissioned) studies showed 
glyphosate did not cause teratogenicity while mentioning increased bone and soft organ anomalies. The 
studies themselves are not public, but the summaries could be analysed and, still according to the same 
review, show teratogenic effects at various dosages.
German assessors apparently glossed over the inconvenient (albeit limited) data and no regulatory action 
ensued. In addition, the 2012 review was ignored during the present renewal procedure. That is the exact 
opposite of what Lesson 3 should have taught, and shows it remains unlearnt.
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Lesson 4: bridge knowledge areas
European regulation 1107/2009 on pesticides requires the EC to address endocrine disruptors and 
determines such problematic chemicals not be accepted under any dosage. EC’s Environment unit (DG 
ENVI), tasked with defining the appropriate criteria, set up a diverse working group in 2010 comprised 
of over 40 elements, including representatives from Member States, academic institutions, other DGs, 
civil society and the industry itself.
Industry, however, lobbied hard until DG SANCO (Health and Consumers, historically more industry-
friendly) replaced DG ENVI in 2014 (Horel, 2015). Part of this takeover included the set up by DG 
SANCO’s EFSA, in 2012, of a nine-member endocrine task force. Irrespective of other details, the 
first composition of this group seems noteworthy. It is particularly relevant only two scientists were 
appointed, with none of those being a mammalian endocrinologist. Other members included several 
officials from two countries opposing DG ENVI and the majority in the group had no endocrinology 
background at all, administrative or otherwise (PAN, 2015).
The contrast between the two DGs couldn’t be more suggestive of a learning inversion as regards Lesson 
4. The inability, or unwillingness, to be inclusive prevailed in the European process.
Lesson 5: account for real life
It was around the epidemiological studies of glyphosate’s cancer causing properties that the current 
German Renewal Assessment Report, most visibly clashed with the 2B classification (probable human 
carcinogen) from IARC. The two assessments differed in a number of crucial aspects, as described 
by Portier et al. (2016). Many would be worth exploring but a particular one, the discordant weight 
attributed to the studies available, is remarkable.
The RAR dismissed on technicalities all case-control studies as not reliable (as opposed to IARC), 
but valued data from the Agricultural Health Study. This large cohort study (which was also noted by 
IARC) elicited no cause-effect relationship for glyphosate and non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL, a type 
of blood cancer showing up in the case-control studies as being connected to glyphosate exposure). 
One problem, however, is the time dimension. In Olsson et al. (1988), for example, the average latency 
period for NHL after exposure to solvents averaged 21 years. In the AHS, on the other hand, the time 
between exposure and assessment averaged a meagre 6.7 years (Portier et al., 2016). This puts the AHS 
data in the possible false negative range, largely reducing its validity at this stage: cancers may be yet to 
arrive. Real life takes time, and the RAR failed to recognise it.
Lesson 6: look into the wider costs and benefits
Pesticides, although defended as a whole by the agrochemical industry, are generally recognised as 
unsustainable to the point of justifying the introduction of genetically modified food crops as a better 
option (Klümper and Qaim, 2014). The question is not asked at the assessment and decision-making 
levels, however, if or when each pesticide’s prospective benefits outweigh any potential impacts. Moreover, 
even if that kind of justification were sought, the analysis would be incomplete. In case there are better 
options, that attain the same objectives with less or no harm, officials would be hard pressed to approve 
any pesticide at all. Whether such alternatives do exist for glyphosate is the topic for the next Lesson.
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Lesson 7: look for the best alternative
No official focused effort has been carried out to look for alternatives that could pave the way for a 
glyphosate free future. Nevertheless, the Julius Kühn-Institut, a German federal research agency, did 
look into the matter (Kehlenbeck et al., 2015) and found that, for the German reality, agricultural and 
non-professional users alike can adjust to lower glyphosate use, concluding ‘glyphosate should not be 
regarded as a standard measure in arable crop production systems’. This information has not percolated 
into any EC decision thus far.
Lesson 8: welcome non-experts too
This lesson is a reminder that non-experts and the public, in general, should be enticed to participate and 
actively heard in technical discussions having a bearing on society, mostly because there is knowledge 
and perspective to be gained. In glyphosate’s case, a public hearing was held by EFSA in 2014. It was, 
unfortunately, ‘entirely unfit for purpose’ according to an environmental group that participated ( John, 
2014). In addition EFSA, according to the same source, eliminated all comments not entirely focused 
on glyphosate, even though it could have chosen to consider formulations such as Roundup which 
constitute the vehicle that channel glyphosate into the world. This approach does not bode well for the 
role of non-experts in European decision making.
Lesson 9: consider the people’s feeling
Regarding glyphosate public values can be gleaned through various ways. In 2015 a petition hosted 
by Avaaz and delivered to DG SANCO contained 1.4 million signatures requesting glyphosate be 
banned (Neslen, 2015). More recently a Yougov poll of 7,000 Europeans in the five largest Member 
States evidenced an expressive two third majority in favour of glyphosate’s demise (Neslen, 2016). The 
decision by the European Commission to go ahead with glyphosate’s reapproval regardless of public 
views argues strongly in favour of this Lesson having been ignored.
Lesson 10: stop undue influence
The German RAR was put out by the Bundesinstitut für Risikobewertung (BfR), an official agency 
reporting to the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The BfR’s 13 member Commission on 
Plant Protection Products and their Residues includes three experts from either Bayer or BASF, among 
others multinationals (BfR, 2016). In addition, the BfR report was not signed by the experts who wrote 
it which, while not corrupt per se, is certainly not transparent and opens the door to undue influence.
Lesson 11: the administration could be the problem
The glyphosate RAR summarises industry toxicological studies, but the full documents are not available 
because of commercial confidentiality (Antoniou et al., 2012). This obstructs evidence cross-examination 
and has been criticized for years, to the point where DG SANCO has announced it is considering 
introducing increased transparency (Matthews, 2016). However, until the EC actually changes the rules, 
the underlying tension will not be solved.
Lesson 12: do not stall
A major example of how Lesson 12 has yet to be learnt is to be found within the European endocrine 
disruptors proceedings, which intimately intertwine with the glyphosate reapproval timeline.
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The 1107/2009 mandate for the definition of endocrine disruptor criteria put the deadline at December 
2013. A draft proposal (disparaged by industry) was ready by July 2013 but the EC then made a U-turn 
and chose to start an impact assessment instead (as demanded by industry), knowing full well this would 
introduce a three-year delay in the process (Horel, 2015). In March 2014 Sweden (later followed by the 
European Council and the Parliament) took the EC to court for failure to act and in December 2015 
the General Court of the European Union ruled the EC had been illegally stalling ( Jacobsen, 2015).
Conclusions
The glyphosate exercise described seems to negatively illustrate every one of the 12 precautionary lessons 
the European Union should have learnt and, at some level, didn’t. As described elsewhere for various 
other instances (EEA, 2013), scientific data is available, but no early protection measures take place. As 
the saying goes, to ignore history is to repeat it. Glyphosate is poised to become a late lesson, which would 
translate into decades of avoidable human suffering and death. A late early warning is hereby served.
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